What
are the advantages of representation for democracy and what concerns does it
raise?
Barry Gilheany ©
This
essay examines the definition of and theoretical contestation around the meaning
of representation in modern democracies.
It argues that effective representation is vital to the functioning of
the deliberative model of democracy that is predominant in most of Europe and
North America through providing its moral backbone; by this is meant regarding
persons as active citizens and autonomous agents who participate in the
governance of their societies directly or through their representatives. However how to ensure the optimum
accountability of governments to their citizens forms the greatest conundrum
that the concept of representation raises.
The essay explores how representation has been problematised and
concludes by asserting that voting in elections alone is an insufficient
guarantee of the health of democracies.
Democracy is a form of rule. In our representative or deliberative democracies
decisions of a majority are binding on everybody including the minority that
finds them against their opinions of interests.
These decisions are made by elected representatives and implemented by
appointed officials to whom the representatives delegate some of the tasks of
governing (Manin et al, 1999).
The concept of representation has been an essentially
contested one in democratic theory. What
does it actually meant to represent? (Shultz, 2014). Almost all discussions of representation, beginning
with John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on
Representative Government[1]
assume that representation is achieved by the election of politicians who
somehow reflect the composition of the electorate (Manin et al, 1999:
p.32). The term became, in the words of
Bernard Bailyn,” Americanised” [2]with the dispute between
the American colonies and Britain in the 18th century with the
demand by the colonists for “no taxation without representation”. Both sides used the same words with different
interpretations. For the British the
colonies were represented in Parliament by virtue of members elected in
Britain. This was not enough for the
colonies who wanted representatives that they chose themselves and who were
geographically closer to home (Shultz: p.138).
But what exactly is being represented? In his speech to
the Bristol Electors in 1774 Edmund Burke proclaimed that his duty as a Member
of Parliament was to exercise his best judgments and not necessarily be a
simple delegate for the wishes of the people.
So do representatives only represent the individuals who voted for them
or do they have a duty to represent all their constituents or perhaps even
their country; this is particularly apposite when legislatures deliberate over
whether to take the country to war. Politics is about the aggregation of issues;
few electorates form a single voice on any single given topic. It is therefore impossible to deduce and then
execute the majority preference on every single issue. Conversely, for pluralist views on democracy,
ignoring the role of groups such as racial and ethnic minorities and women
could precipitate the breakdown of a representative system. Thus representation
may or may not be effective depending on one’s viewpoint (Schultz: pp139-140).
The question of representation is thus why would
rulers as the bearers of binding powers act in the best interests of their citizens
or at least some majority thereof.
Hannah Pitkin in 1967[3] defined representation as
acting in the best interests of the public.
But she queried whether proportionality is the best way to secure
representation. Would the best interest
of the body politic be served if each representative voices opinions and claims
to promote the interests of their constituency? What if, after their election,
they acquire knowledge their constituents do not have and possibly even
interests of their own? For in such
scenarios, the reelection of an incumbent “is not absolute proof that he is a
good representative; it proves at most that voters think so.”[4] (Manin et al, p.32).
Effective representation is essential to the life
blood of democracy. Robert Dahl[5] lists five criteria or
values for democracy. These are voting
equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding, control of the
agenda, and inclusion. Dahl’s criteria
are similar to those prerequisites defined by other democratic theorists.[6] (Shultz, pp.47-48). What
then are the mechanisms for ensuring effective and fair representation in
modern representative or deliberative democracies and how do they measure up
against Dahl’s criteria?
At this stage I should state that the representative model
is the most viable model for democracy in the developed world because the large
number of citizens in modern democracies mean that the advantages of direct
democracy can only be realised in local
units or subunits of the political system (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Critically, representative democracy places a
very high premium on citizens holding their representatives to account. To the
extent that they fail to do so, or are prevented from doing so, their
representatives may fail to act responsibly or even honestly.
The main mechanisms for accountability and the
signaling of preferences in modern polities are elections although signals can
be sent in other ways such as public opinion polls, focus groups and, even,
street demonstrations. Given majority
rule, a government is representative in two ways; in the narrow (“mandate”)
sense; if it adopts the policies
preferred by the specific majority by which it was elected, or if it is
representative in a broader (“top cycle”) sense as long as it pursues the
interests of any majority. In either
case a government is not representative if it pursues a course of action that
would be defeated by every majority, that is as long as it acts in the interest
of a minority.
The “mandate” view of elections is to be distinguished
from the “accountability” view. In the
first citizens signal to governments what to do, in the second, they judge
whether governments have done what they should.
Implementation of electoral promises should be expected whenever the desires
of politicians and voters cohere or whenever politicians seeking reelection
expect voters to stick to their initial preferences. However incumbents may keep to their promises
even if their implementation is inimical to the well-being of citizens or, alternatively,
they may deviate from their promises for the greater good. Hence “mandate- representation”- in the sense
that mandates are faithfully implemented in the best interest of the
electorate- is fragile. In turn the
threat of the electoral sanction is undermined when voters do not observe
various things that politicians observe or know (Marin et al, p.160).
In Latin American democracies, politicians such as
Presidents Menem of Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s deviated
regularly from their mandates on economic matters such as deficit reduction and
privatisation showing that they were unresponsive to citizens when they switched
policies. In these countries, citizens
appear to have been seriously ill-informed about the choices they faced and
about the likely consequences; they held these erroneous technical beliefs
because politicians chose not to persuade them but rather told them what they
wanted to hear in the heat of campaigns.
In this situation politicians had dissimulated after rather than before elections. The policy switchers, even when secure in
office, made no attempt to persuade their electorates that the policies they
had voted against would in the end prove superior (Stokes, 1999: pp 128-130).
The type of dissimulation thus described can do untold
damage to the democratic legitimacy states, particularly new democracies such
as in Latin America. For a major
consequence of disappointing government performance in new democracies is
widespread disillusion with democracy followed by a return to
authoritarianism. In any democracy the
success of electoral accountability depends on two interdependent expectations:
voters’ belief that politicians will respond to electoral incentives and
politicians’ expectation that voters will punish them for a poor
performance. The demands on elections as
mechanisms of political accountability are greater in new than established democracies
as politicians have yet to establish reputations, a condition that enables the
entry of undesirable candidates into politics.
Such characters view this period as their one and only opportunity for
personal enrichment. A syndrome of
pessimistic expectations may then emerge with voters rationally concluding that
“all politicians are crooks” leading to the eventual breakdown of democracy
(Svolik, 2013).
The rise of Nazism during Weimar Germany amidst the
cataclysm of the Great Depression in the 1930s and Russia’s current reversion
to authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin after the economic instability of the
democratic era under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s provide two examples of the existential danger
for new democracies posed by economic downturns (Svolik, 2013: p.685).
This essay has established that elections are just not
a sufficient instrument of democratic control.
Democracies require electoral institutions that enhance clarity of
responsibility and make it easy for citizens to reward and punish those
responsible. Such “accountability
agencies” would function in the manner of the Australian Commission on
Government Reform[7].
Such institutions may include: an independent board to assure transparency of
campaign contributions with its own investigatory powers; an independent
auditing branch of the state[8]; an independent source of
statistical information about the economy and a role for the opposition in the
scrutiny of the publicly owned media (Manin et al, p.50).
This essay has argued for an effective form of
representation which can act as a firewall against the tyranny of the majority
which James Madison in Federalist 10
worried would be the consequence of direct democracy and in which
representatives could filter the passions of the people and do a better job in
promoting the public good (Schultz, p.138).
However to achieve these lofty goals, effective mechanisms of
accountability are essential as are public confidence in the competence of
policy makers and the quality of technical information provided by the state.
Bibliography
Gutmann. A and Thompson, D., 2004 Why Deliberative Democracy?
Manin, B., Przeworski, A. and Stokes, S.C. 1999 Introduction in Przeworski, A., Stokes,
S.C. and Manin, B. 1999 Democracy, Accountability
and Representation Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Cambridge Studies in the Theory of
Democracy Series
Manin, B., Przeworski, A. and Stokes, S.C. 1999 Elections and Representation in
Przeworski et al
Schultz, D., 2014 Election
Law and Democratic Theory Ashgate Election
Law, Politics and Theory Series
Stokes, S.C. 1999 What
Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy in Przeworski et al
Svolik, M.V.2013. Learning
to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy.
American Journal of Political Science, 57(3), pp.685-702
© Barry Gilheany
[1] Mill, J.S., 1991. [1861] Considerations on Representative Government.
Buffalo, N.Y: Prometheus Press
[6] See, e.g. Pennock, J (1979) Democratic Political Theory; and
Sartori, G (1987) The Theory of Democracy
Revisited, 2 vols
[7] Dunn, Delmer D., and
Uhr, John (1993) Accountability and
Responsibility in Modern Democratic Governments Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C.,
September 2-5
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