“Nuclear Disarmament is desirable but not feasible”
Critically discuss.
Barry Gilheany ©
This
essay sketches out possible road maps towards generalised, global and
multilateral nuclear disarmament. In so
doing, it emphasises that decrying nuclear weapons as horrible instruments of
war on its own is totally impractical.
Scholars, activists and practitioners in the area of disarmament must
analyse and deal with the realities of the changed international security
environment over the last half-century; from a bipolar order in which two
superpowers (US and USSR) armed with multiple nuclear warheads faced each other
down to the post-Cold War multipolar order in which we live where regional
nuclear powers have emerged with their own security imperatives and which
requires different regulatory regimes.
It examines the theories of deterrence and proliferation that have
underpinned both nuclear orders (and which have straddled each other) and
suggests ways in which ideas and discourse around peace and disarmament can be
integrated into policy environments. It
concludes by rejecting the arguments for the benefits of nuclear weapons
proliferation advanced by some “realist” scholars while acknowledging the formidable
obstacles that lie in the way of effective multilateral disarmament.
The
major fault-line in academic and policy debates on nuclear proliferation
divides those who equate nuclear weapons spread with international stability,
other things being equal, with international stability, from those who worry
about the risks of inadvertent war from proliferation.(Cimbala, 2015). The assumptions of major realist theories
expounded by the former camp derive from a Hobbesian view of the world as
perpetually warring factions requiring containment by an overarching Leviathan.
These
assumptions are that there is an inherent lust for power on the part of states
or governments, based on human nature.
Regional or global hegemony is the ultimate goal of states. States seek to maintain the existing balance
of power arrangements within the current international system and will seek to
alter the status quo to their advantage in incremental stages. Realist principles tend to be highly abstract
and to be inherently pessimistic about international relations. (Cimbala, p.165).
A
particular strand of realism is known as “proliferation optimism”. This brand of neo-realism argues that nuclear
weapons ensure that actors in an otherwise state of Hobbesian anarchy will
behave peacefully and rationally.
Consequently, widespread nuclear proliferation ensures peace and
stability (Woods, 2002).
According
to its proponents, nuclear optimism incentivises states on the basis of
self-interest to restrain aggressive behaviour due to the threat of
annihilation in a nuclear holocaust. The spread of nuclear weapons can avert
the dangers of limited nuclear war and escalation by the guarantee of cast-iron
deterrence to every recipient the prospect of nuclear war becomes virtually
impossible. It furthermore nullifies the
need for costly diplomatic initiatives designed to bolster suspect alliance
commitments. By rendering nuclear-armed
states neutral and impotent, proliferation aids the global economy by enabling
states to fully realise their economic potential. Proliferation optimists ultimately believe
that the possession of nuclear weapons facilitates rational behaviour in all
states, regardless of the leadership qualities of the regimes in power (e.g.
Iran and North Korea). (Woods: pp.167-169).
Proliferation
scholars such as Pierre Gallois and Donald L. Clark conclude that nuclear
proliferation makes permanent global security a realistic goal. Until this goal is achieved, nations will
not sign up to additional arms control measures. Since war continues only in those areas
without nuclear arms, non-proliferation efforts represent not just obstacles to
national security – they are immoral.
According to this account it is the emotions associated with the
memories of the destruction of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, that prevents acknowledgement of the trump value of the
nuclear weapon in war(Woods: p.170).
Using
analogies from micro-economics, Kenneth Waltz, arguably the most prominent
neo-realist scholar, reimagines the world of diverse states as a stable,
bipolar universe (USA and USSR) of units, of rational, interest maximising
actors. The fear of apocalypse
engendered by nuclear weapons which elevates rationality and sanctifies
immediate deterrence also works for extended deterrence. For so-called rogue states, aware of the
impossibility of victory, will have reason to restrain both their inflammatory
words and deeds. In a crisis or
showdown, nuclear armed states will naturally incline towards restraint. The
example of Israel is cited as evidence for the claim that small, vulnerable
(even messianic) states will behave rationally when nuclear armed (Woods:
p.173).
The
major problem with such types of “extended deterrence” and “proliferation
optimism” theories in the eyes of their critics is their sheer determinism. In
the oligopolistic world of International politics the few rule the many. Thus there is no “system” to which the
dominant powers, unlike the remaining states, are subject against their
wishes. Realists are blind to the
regional tiers of dominance that
exist in the international order In a determinant “system”, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq would not
have defied UN Security Resolutions on disarmament over twelve years from 1991
of sanctions, intrusive inspections and international military policing and
succeeded in driving such fatal
diplomatic wedges in both the Security Council and NATO in 2003 forcing the US
and its minimal “coalition of the willing
to intervene unilaterally (Cimbala: pp.167-168).
Proponents
of deterrence during the Cold War advocated that the superpowers develop
massive nuclear arsenals which they did.
But they never said how much of an arsenal and what exactly would it
take to deter conventional conflict. It
is difficult to calibrate the deterrent power of the nuclear arsenals of the
superpowers as they were so much more superior militarily than the other states
in the system that their ability to deter non-superpower states was
overdetermined. Thus the superpower
nuclear balance is an insufficient analytical tool for assessing the extent to
which the possession and expansion of nuclear weaponry acts as a deterrent to
potential aggressors (Narang, 2014).
Finally
in relation to deterrence theory and practice, it can be seen that, viewed
through the lens of conservatism of
Edmund Burke, proliferation optimism reproduces a pessimistic view of human
nature, integral to conservative philosophy, that seemingly runs counter to the
rationality and modernity valorised in the thinking of scholars like Waltz.
The core of Burkean conservatism is to
be found in his seminal work Reflections
on the Revolution in France published in 1790 As such it is a refutation of the rationalist
belief that man could explain and so
regulate every aspect of human social life (Woods:p.178).
Burkean
conservatism has three interrelated elements. The first prescribes leadership
qualities for the good society. Leaders
must be imbued with various moral qualities such as virtue and the ability to
assimilate and put into practice received wisdom from earlier generations in
the art of governance rather than the desire to implement rationalist projects
based on abstract theory. Persons are
most likely to develop those qualities within the ruling class and political
leadership is provided by exceptional human beings of wise counsel (Woods:
pp.178-179).
Second,
conservatism validates lasting organic (versus
contrived) social institutions as the best mode of governance. Established institutions inform the attitudes
and behaviour of the ordinary person and the elites and enhance wisdom, skills
and accomplishments. Within
conservatism, leadership and institutions blend to effect its core components
of veneration of family, community, church, tradition and authority and disdain
of liberal individualism, rapid social change and autonomous reason (as in
science and progress). Leadership and
institutions combine to produce the third, and most existential, element – it’s
pessimistic view of human nature.
Conservatives of all complexions view humanity as imperfectible; they
fear the tyranny of the mob on the basis that ‘men acting on their own
uncontrolled impulses, will act badly’. (Woods: pp.180-181).
Optimism
resembles conservatism in these ways.
Its vision of a proliferated world equates to conservatism’s version of
the good society. Nuclear weapon states
are its wise and venerated leaders,
deterrence as a body of theory and practice is it lasting and trusting
institution and all other states are ordinary actors to which the power to rule
may be delegated. Strategic deterrence
is a prescriptive body of doctrine and received practices that: prescribes the
right behaviour (revives extended deterrence); refuses to inquire into its
practical origins and absolves leaders of requirements to legitimise inherited
privileges (Permanent Security Council seats) or property (nuclear arms). In this account, the non-proliferation
movement represents a fundamental threat
as it implores states to not do what they must, namely acquire what they
need to survive. Finally and
surprisingly, bearing in minds its origins in microeconomic theory, optimism
cautions that certain states be denied nuclear weapons because they are
governed by base passions; being driven by a will to power(Woods: pp.184-186).
Having
called into question the foundational principles and falsifiability of nuclear
deterrence theories, it is now appropriate to tease out how nuclear disarmament
can be achieved and the practicalities involved. In particular how can the traditionally separated
spheres of ideas and action co-operate to produce policy proposals which will
move forward a currently deadlocked nuclear arms control agenda (Thakur, 2011)?
Nuclear
arms control regimes are based on the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT regime faces five
challenges: the failure of nuclear disarmament by the five NPT-licit nuclear
powers (US, UK, France, China and Russia); the possible violation by
non-nuclear signatories like Iran and North Korea; India, Israel and Pakistan
remaining outside the NPT; terrorists’ interests in getting hold of nuclear
weapons; and the possible security risks
of the increased interest in nuclear energy to offset the financial and
environmental costs of fossil fuel (Thakur: p.34).
There
have been some recent salient developments though. In 2010 a US Nuclear Posture Review reduced
the role of nuclear weapons in defence strategy and placed additional
restrictions on their use; a new Russia-US treaty slashed strategic arsenals by
about one-third, a summit in Washington undertook to tighten the security of
nuclear materials and trade and there was a five-year NPT Review Conference in
New York in May (Thakur: p.34). This
year saw a breakthrough in the imbroglio over Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons
programme with a US led final agreement to be agreed by 30th June
2015 to provide for indefinite access to Iranian nuclear facilities in return
for which certain sanctions will be lifted[1]
Nuclear
disarmament will prove difficult to achieve because of the dynamics of the ‘second
nuclear age’ in which a multipolar nuclear order is taking shape which is
likely to be characterised by regional nuclear arms races, crises in the
regions, and nuclear competition among major powers (Bracken, 2013). Their nuclear choices and their relative
power positions are distinct from the superpowers of the Cold War era,
demanding theories and analysis distinct from Cold War scholarship which
dominates present thinking on security and deterrence (Narang: p.299).
In his analysis of the “fifty-year problem” of
nuclear strategy, Bracken asserts that although a grand design for world order
that gets rid of the bomb, especially one that greatly benefits the USA is
undoubtedly desirable, conflation of this desire with feasibility isn’t good
policy analysis. For getting rid of the
bomb will not, in his opinion, happen any time soon (Bracken: p.2).
It won’t happen because major powers such as Russia,
China and India, along with the secondary nuclear powers Pakistan, Israel and
North Korea (and possibly Iran), are uncertain about the future of the world
and can envisage a myriad of differing possibilities and outcomes. The decline in the capacity of the US to
enforce order in various regions and the absence of promised governance
structures, and the spread of advanced weaponry of all kinds makes any
declaration of unilateral disarmament by any of the above states most
unlikely. Furthermore, distrust of the
United States has also given impetus to the spread of the bomb as a counter to
American military interventions.
Counties like Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and China hardly desire a
world that is “safe” for a US that has vast superiority in conventional weapons
technology. For these states the bomb
raises the risk levels for the US in any military showdown (Bracken: p.6). This factor also gives the lie to the notion
peddled by proliferation optimists that possession of the bomb by “rogue
states” will engender “good behaviour” by their leaderships.
For Bracken management of the regional nuclear
hotspots such as the Korean peninsula
and the Arab-Israeli and Kashmir disputes is more important than the search for
an overarching strategy such as containment and deterrence (Bracken: p.8). In mapping out pathways to universal nuclear
disarmament; Cerutti states his preference for this term over “abolition” as
after such an “event” cheaters and free riders could secretly rearm but, more
importantly, disarming states may require an insurance policy against cheaters
and free riders through a nuclear armed Security Council. Even if renouncements do occur, states may
still want to rely exclusively on reciprocal trust and look for a minimum force
in neutral hands (Cerutti, 2008).
Having stated that minimum deterrence is this
generation’s most realistic nuclear disarmament goal, Cerutti proposes the
following policy measures: a “no first use” convention, the de-alerting of
nuclear systems; re-legitimate the NPT by finally taking seriously Article. IV,
(“states in a position to do so shall help non-nuclear, especially developing
states in pursuing the peaceful application of nuclear energy”) and, as the
Canberra Commission emphasised, Article VI (“all parties to the Treaty shall
work for a treaty on general and complete disarmament”) (Cerutti, 208:
pp.207-208).
Underpinning these proposals would be two
constitutional initiatives: the establishment by governments of an ombudsman for future generations who
would monitor laws and administrative acts for their supposed impacts on our
far posterity and, related to this, the recognition of the right of humanity to survival under decent conditions, which would
be written into constitutions and bind governments not to act in contravention
of this goal. This would represent a
pinnacle for human rights and would vindicate sovereignty in its deeper meaning
of autonomous power over the existential issues of the global polity in which
we live. (Cerutti: p.208). This is
democratic theory for a nuclear age
Finally, disarmament initiatives need to be
intellectually bolstered by peace research (PR) programmes that can be
integrated into the policy making environment.
PR aims to control the manifestation of arms and violence, including
structural violence – more people die from poverty and malnutrition than in
armed conflicts. PR assumptions contrast
with the realist assumptions that violence is endemic and an instrument of
statecraft which permeate strategic studies (SS). PR offers critical alternatives to the
realist narratives of violence and security and changes focus from security of
the state to the welfare and security of the individual. PR has a constituency inside the governments
of few countries but nuclear arms control and disarmament specialists are
welcome in international organisations such as the UN (Thakur: pp.35-36).
To be taken seriously by policymakers, scholars need
to adapt their approaches to fit into ha the dominant discourse and speak the
language of applied research. The shift
in diplomacy from the world of the “club” to the newer “networked” model has
created opportunities for PR scholars in international bodies such as the UN
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the UN Secretary-General’s
advisory group on disarmament. The German delegate to the 2010 NPT conference
included Harald Mueller of the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute. It is to be
hoped that governments can tap into such scholarly expertise by expanding the
scope of such structured opportunities for interaction between academic and
policy maker (Thakur: pp.38-42).
In conclusion, demands for the abolition of nuclear
weapons may raise the moral self-esteem of their authors and addressees but
rarely live up to the imperatives of challenging scholars to construct ideas
around nuclear disarmament that deal effectively with the nitty-gritty of
politics and to look for endorsement from the appropriate social forces and
historical tendencies (Cerutti, p.208).
While I would oppose the crude reductionism of neo-realist theories, I
believe that there can be no single moment of world-wide nuclear disarmament. The current accord on Iranian nuclear
capability offers a suitable template for future arms reduction initiatives.
Bibliography
Bracken, P. (2013) The Second Nuclear Age. Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics.
New York: St. Martin’s Griffin
Cerutti, F. (2008) Global Challenges for Leviathan.
A Political Philosophy of Nuclear Weapons and Global Warming. Plymouth:
Lexington Books
Cimbala, S.J. (2015) the New Nuclear Disorder. Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy .Farnham:
Ashgate
Narang, V. (2014) Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era. Regional Powers and International
Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Thakur, R. (2011) Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: Can the Power of Ideas Tame
the Power of the State? International Studies Review, 13, pp.34-45
Woods, M. (2002) Reflections
on Nuclear Optimism: Waltz, Burke and Proliferation. Review of International
Studies, 28, pp.163-189
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