Is the EU a declining power?
Barry
Gilheany © 2015
To answer this
question, consideration must be given to what sort of political entity the
European Union is; what its external policy goals and objectives are, the
centripetal and centrifugal influences that are exercised on it as an actor and
how it has adapted to the challenges of the first decade and a half of the 21st
century; particularly the security environment that emerged after the events of
9/11; the emergence of a multipolar world and the EU’s own legitimacy crises
over the troubles in the Eurozone from 2010 and the growing skepticism towards the European project among electors
in member states . The essay surveys the
successes and failures of the EU’s principal foreign policy instrument, the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework and assess how EU foreign
policy behaviour can be categorised within International Relations theory. It arrives at the tentative conclusion that
as the EU is an unfinished project, a work in progress; it will have to choose
between being a regional multilateral actor or seeking to develop cooperative
arrangements with old powers such as the USA and new powers such as Russia,
China and India. The EU is a power not
so much in decline but in transition.
The European Union is best described as an unfinished
federal quasi-state. It differs from all
other regional organisations including the United Nations as it has a partially
developed supranational character; the Union can, under some circumstances,
arrive at decisions binding its member states against their will (Pelinka,
2011).
The EU has 28 member states but has a balanced federal
structure with no dominant “centre”; Brussels (contrary to the claims of many
“Eurosceptics”) does not dominate in the same way that Paris dominated the
Napoleonic Empire (Pelinka, p.23). The
member states pool sovereignty but retain autonomy in crucial areas (e.g. the
UK opt- out of the single currency). The
EU now, and in its previous manifestations of the Common Market, EEC and
European Community, is still primarily a trading body but the imperative
towards political integration has always been present throughout the evolution
of the Union.
In is in the realm of trade that the EU most deserves
the appellation “power”. As a trade
bloc, its share of world trade – approx. one-quarter- makes the Union the
world’s largest trading federations. The
euro (up until the current crisis) provided regional exchange stability and is
the reserve currency for many countries including China. The EU has a population of 450 million and is
surrounded by 500 million neighbours, both a potential market and labour
pool. By 2007, the GDP of the wider EU
member states had overtaken that of the USA (to about 12.5 billion Euros)
making access to the EU market a lucrative prospect. EU development policy is, in terms of scope
and budget, the largest and most comprehensive globally. The EU is acknowledged, after the Kyoto and
Bali conferences, as the world’s leading player in environmental policy and in
the battle against climate change.
Finally, the EU benefits from the largest network of bilateral,
multilateral and interregional agreements with proximate and distant partners. It is because of these capacities that some
writes have sought to classify the EU as a “civilian power” (Telo, 2009).
Despite the functionalist dynamic behind the various
stages of the evolution of the European project (e.g. French interests should
include an interest in German prosperity, formation of the European Coal and
Steel Community); political integration was the goal from the outset. The desire for political integration was
borne out of the experiences of the 20th century’s two global wars
which began in Europe and the very European experience of the
Shoah/Holocaust. The fundamental
antithesis of European integration was the evils of European nationalisms; the
“defining other” of the European project is the Europe of the past. (Another earlier “defining other” was Soviet
Communism). (Pelinka, p.24)
This determination to prevent any recurrence of Europe’s
conflictual past and the Union’s supranational character has helped to frame
the EU’s five foreign policy making objectives: the encouragement of regional
co-operation and integration; the promotion of human rights; the promotion of
democracy and good governance; the prevention of violent conflicts and the
fight against international crime. These
are laid down in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Smith, 2014).
The specific framework for EU foreign policy is the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but it also encompasses other aspects
of EU ‘external relations’ previously coming under the aegis of what were the
‘pillars’ of the European Community (EC) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) but
now compose part of a supranational EU framework. In December 2003, the European Council agreed
on a European Security Strategy (ESS) which can be interpreted as a response to
the transatlantic rift over Iraq and US doctrines of preemptive attack. Its three core strategic objectives area:
addressing security threats from terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional
conflict, state failure and organized crime; enhancing security in the EU’s neighbourhood
and creating an international order based on ‘effective multilateralism’ in the
upholding of international law. The
Lisbon Treaty of 2009 brought together all of the above in its Objectives for
the EU’s external action (Smith, pp.3-7).
Because member states still have the prerogative of
pursuing their foreign policy interests separately, the tools and objectives
are EU foreign policy-making are necessary limited to those which do not offend
member state sensitivities or interests.
For example, the EU has to respect the military neutrality Ireland,
Austria and Finland. Consequently, the
Union is weakest in its military capabilities.
There can be clashes between the EU institutions as the supranational
European Commission and the Council of Ministers which is protective of the
interests of member states, even though ‘horizontal coherence’ between EU
frameworks has long been a treaty necessity (Smith, p.8).
The EU’s relative lack of military clout means that
for many commentators the Union can exercise little influence. For the realist International Relations
scholar Robert Kagan a Europe that does not possess strong military
capabilities and the readiness to use them will always have to rely on the USA
as a guarantor of international stability and protector of common interests in
what is still a markedly Hobbesian world.
Intergovermentalist theorists argue that while international
institutions can circumvent limits to cooperation, these institutions act to
pursue member state interests and large states will not accept outcomes that
counteract these interests. Others, such
as Christopher Hill and William Wallace argue that there will never be an
effective EU foreign policy until a distinctive European in identity emerges
that is concretised in a European state and demos
(Smith; pp.8-10).
However as well as the leading environmental
development aid roles alluded to previously, the EU has become, albeit
incrementally, a larger diplomatic peace making power on the world stage. The overstretch that the USA has experienced
in Iraq and Afghanistan has brought home to it the impossibility of fulfilling
the role of global policeman alone has created opportunities in the realm of
global security (Pelinka, p.280. The
tasks that the EU engages in through the framework of the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP), an offspring of the benign post-1989 security climate
for western democracies, are defined in
the 1992 Western European Union (WEU) Petersberg Declaration as humanitarian
and rescue tasks, peace keeping and crisis management (Toje, 2010). The St Malo declaration in 1998 following a
meeting between President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair stated that: “The
European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do
so, in order to respond to international crises …”. This declaration signified a landmark
overturning of the long-standing UK dictum that no such capability could be
permitted to exist outside NATO (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).
Under the ambit of St Malo and the Petersberg
Declaration, the ESDP has conducted three EU Force military deployment
operations in Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina
in 2003-4 and three police missions to these countries which have preceded or
succeeded the military forces. Another
mode of operation has provided technical missions to Georgia and Iraq to establish
rule of law and criminal justice systems (Bretherton and Vogler; p, 204)
In terms of capabilities, the EU had in 2004 1,8
million military personnel under arms and although it does not strive to match
the military hyper-power of the USA, it has sought, since the announcement of
the Helsinki 60,000 strong force ‘headline goal’ in December 1999, to organize
forces that could undertake the ‘Petersberg tasks’. Seven or more specialized
battalion size ‘battle groups were to be available by 2007 which are earmarked
specifically for deployment under a UN mandate. These steps were taken in
accordance with the declaration by the European Council in 2003 that ‘Europe
should be ready to share the responsibility for global security and in building
a better world’. The Security Strategy
drawn up in 2003 gives some guidance as to the nature of future active military
tasks of the ESDP. However the language of the ESDP is clouded (perhaps
intentionally) in ambiguity as war fighting
and global power protection are not the functions of the ESDP, but
stabilisation and peace enforcement beyond Europe are Bretherton and Vogler:
pp.208-9).
In accordance with EU commitment to multilateralism as
the optimal way to conduct international relations, all ESDP military and
police operations are performed under the auspices of the UN Security Council
and includes regular contributors from countries outside the EU including
Canada, Switzerland and Norway. The EU
has considerable capacity in the response to complex, multi-faceted situations
such as civilian crises that have followed military interventions in the
Balkans and Afghanistan where it has used its expertise and adeptness and
multilateral relationships to engage in extensive conflict prevention
activities and to help in combating organized crime, drug and people trafficking
and international terrorism (Bretherton and Vogler: pp.210 -12).
In seeking to ascertain if the EU is a declining
power, this essay has focused on EU foreign policy making and security and defence capabilities; areas
which are seen as markers of ‘hard power’.
Although the EU can never aspire to (nor does it desire) compete with
the military prowess of the USA (or an emergent superpower as China), it role
as a trading bloc and growing prominence as a diplomatic and peacemaking force
does mark it as a distinctive and influential actor in world politics and
economics. The EU is an incipient,
middle – range power which has to choose being a regional multilateral entity
and the need for partnerships with old powers such as the US and the emergent
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) powers (Telo: .53) The EU
is a response to and is a function of Europe’s unique historical experience
(Toje: p.11) of the destructive effects of nationalism. It’s security remit resides in the promotion of
ethical values such protection of human rights, good governance, tackling of
climate change and conflict resolution an is embedded in a vortex of multilateral arrangements which
can bring these goals to fruition.
Ultimately, the EU must develop these necessary structural capacities
for acting in a globally responsible way.
But these capacities can only develop in tandem with European political
integration; a process which is neither stalled nor is reaching any degree of
finality ((Pelinka: p.29). The EU is
thus a continually maturing power not a declining power.
Bibliography:
Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (2006) The European Union as a Global Actor
Second Edition Oxford: Routledge
Pelinka, A. (2011) The
European Union as an Alternative to the Nation-State. International Journal
of Politics, Culture, and Society. The
End of the Nation-State Vol. 24 No.1/2
pp.21-30
Smith, K.E. (2014) European
Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World Third Edition Cambridge: Polity
Telo, M. (2009) The
European Union: Division and Unity in European External Politics pp. 36-57
in Gamble, A. & Lane, D. The European
Union and World Politics. Consensus and Division Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan
Toje, A. (2010) The
European Union as a Small Power After the Post-Cold War
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